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Introduction
This article is about the practicalities of teaching critical thinkingto a varied undergraduate audience. Ostensibly it is the casestudy of a particular course that the author has taught on and
helped develop over several years, but its fundamental aim is to con-
tribute ideas about how we might generally approach the teaching of
critical thinking ‘beyond philosophy’. To achieve this, the main chal-
lenges identified are, firstly, to make it accessible and engaging;
secondly, to clearly demonstrate its broad relevance to everyday and
professional life, and thirdly, to abet students’ recognition of its rele-
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vance to their other subjects, and to their development as learners (in
terms of a) analytical skills, b) a learning tool, and c) substantial con-
nections with other subject matter). The undergirding conviction is that
these are all achievable and, indeed, that amongst the subdivisions of
philosophy, critical thinking (or informal logic) has some of the most
widespread and immediate benefits and applications. 
The evidence that informs the claims made is mostly experien-
tial; the result of half a dozen years teaching in this subject area; trying
a variety of methods and course content; facing a wide range of com-
pliments, constructive criticisms, and indifference from students, (and
colleagues) and observing those involved undergo transformation and
trauma. In the small campus setting in which the author works,
informal feedback is easily elicited and, in fact, hard to avoid. In
addition, as teachers we soon come to know the signs of whether a
lecture or seminar is working or not, and with a combination of careful
reflection, experimentation and intuition, we can, in varying degrees,
fathom what is behind successes and failures. Further, non-experiential,
sources of data drawn on are feedback from course evaluation forms,
and formal research carried out into student learning experiences at the
campus.1
Context
The teaching of critical thinking at the University of Glasgow’s
Dumfries Campus2 primarily occurs in the level 2 (2nd year) course
Argumentation-Rhetoric-Theory (A-R-T). This is termed a ‘core
course’3 within the School’s Liberal Arts curriculum,4 but can be
understood more straightforwardly as a critical thinking, or informal
1 See Hanscomb, S. ‘The Critical Being of the Liberal Arts Student’, Discourse,
Vol.7, no.2, 2007; Harvey, Pattie and McFarlane-Dick, Reflections on Employabili-
ty: Current Strategies for Employability in Higher Education, Interim Report (Uni-
versity of Glasgow, internal document, February 2007).
2 Now officially referred to as the ‘School of Interdisciplinary Studies’.
3 A ‘course’ at the University of Glasgow is what is elsewhere called a ‘module’
4 For further details see See Franks, B., ‘Philosophy and Interdisciplinarity’, Dis-
course, Vol. 6, no.2, 2006; and Hanscomb, S., ‘Philosophy, Interdisciplinarity and
Critical Being’, Discourse, Vol. 7, no. 1, 2007.
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logic course that must appeal to students from a range of disciplines.
This will be a recognizable challenge for philosophy teachers at insti-
tutions where a ‘breadth’ component has been integrated into some or
all of their degrees,5 as well as in places where critical thinking consti-
tutes a subsidiary module offered by philosophy departments.
In such circumstances the three aims identified—to capture
students’ interest and imagination; to communicate the broad relevance
of critical thinking, and to engender a recognition of its value in other
disciplines and as a learning tool—become all the more urgent. I will
discuss how the A-R-T course addresses each of these, and then
conclude with some critical and speculative comments about the rela-
tionship between critical thinking and the wider academic context.
The basics of the course
The first half of the A-R-T course coalesces around two components:
the process of ‘argument reconstruction and evaluation’, and the film
(and play) Twelve Angry Men. Argument reconstruction and evaluation
is adopted from Tracy Bowell and Gary Kemp’s book Critical
Thinking.6 The method, described briefly, involves accessible and short
written texts—such as passages from books, transcriptions of speeches,
and columns and letters from newspapers—are unpacked and analysed
with the aim of exposing the arguments they contain. They are then
assessed in terms of the strengths and weaknesses of these arguments
and the use of rhetorical devices.    
These steps employ a significant range of skills: identifying
premises and conclusions; removing extraneous material; re-ordering
and formalizing arguments in terms of explicit and implicit premises,
5 For example Melbourne, Harvard, Aberdeen and Chichester. The Melbourne
model, for instance, requires students to take 25% of their courses from subjects,
potentially in other faculties, that are different from their main subject. Of particular
relevance to the Dumfries Campus curriculum are their newly developed ‘breadth
subjects’. These deliberately focus on ‘big questions’ (such as climate change,
health, and the Internet) and generic knowledge (such as critical thinking, logic, sta-
tistics), and most require interdisciplinary learning and teaching. See
http://www.futurestudents.unimelb. edu.au/ about/m_ model/ index.html
6 Now in its third edition (2009).
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conclusions, and sub-conclusions (using P1, P2 … C1 etc.); identifying
argument types (deductive, inductive, plausible); identifying vagueness
and ambiguity; re-wording, and spotting fallacies. 
In the latter case the course differs in its approach from Bowell
and Kemp and sides with philosophers like Douglas Walton and
Christopher Tindale7 (themselves influenced by the Amsterdam school
of argumentation (or pragma-dialectics)). According to this perspective
ad hominem, ad verecundiam, ad populum arguments (and so on) are
not necessarily regarded as fallacious, but are instead described as
argument forms that can be fallacious, but always depending upon the
context in which they appear. The upshot of this is that an extra level
of uncertainty is added to the already inexact art of argument recon-
struction and evaluation. Rarely will the wider context of a particular
set of arguments be fully understood, and therefore a reconstruction
and evaluation requires a significant amount of conditionality; of ‘this
could be a strong argument if …’ type clauses. 
This conflict is also useful for highlighting a central principle of
the course, namely the importance of context for accessing the strength
of arguments. Although an extremely useful method for both teaching
and applying critical thinking, argument reconstruction and evaluation
has its limitations. The restricted context surrounding the passages used
is one of these, but in A-R-T the very exposing of these limitations is
part of the course’s aims. In this way the student can be primed for the
more holistic and context-sensitive post-modern and feminist chal-
lenges to traditional approaches to logic and informal logic that are
addressed in the ‘Theory’ part of the course.
The context problem is also mitigated by the other central com-
ponent, Twelve Angry Men. Its value as a teaching resource is perhaps
better known to social psychologists (as a demonstration of processes
of social influence), but from the point of view of argument analysis
and evaluation it is also of immense use.8 There are several reasons for
this. One is that it provides much of the necessary context needed for
7 Whose textbooks are the main recommended course texts (Walton, D., Funda-
mentals of Critical Argumentation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006);
Tindale, C., Fallacies and Argument Appraisal (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2007)).
8 The 1957 film is shown to the students during the course, and they are strongly
encouraged to buy a copy of the book.
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developed discussions surrounding the argument forms and fallacies
exhibited. In essence it is a feature length ‘persuasion dialogue’ con-
cerning the young defendant’s innocence, with twelve protagonists and
numerous arguments of varying complexity and quality. Another is the
sheer range of argument forms and fallacies that are in evidence. These
are well into double figures (and the number of individual arguments
must be in three figures). There are several examples of valid and
strong arguments, and multiple instances of fallacious ad hominems, ad
verecundiams, ad populums, and slippery slopes. There are also weak
analogies, straw men, false dichotomies, perfectionist fallacies and a
number of others. A third reason for making this text pivotal is the clear
connections the film makes between argumentation and, on the one
hand, psychology, and on the other, ethics and politics. 
In the ‘Rhetoric’ section of the course Plato’s criticisms of
rhetoric are explored, Aristotle’s Art of Rhetoric and the modern psy-
chology of persuasion are compared and contrasted, and the over-
arching question of whether argumentation and rhetoric can be clearly
distinguished is debated. In this way the context issue remains relevant,
and deeper questions can be asked concerning the relationship between
reason and emotion. The ‘Theory’ segment, as mentioned, serves to
further situate argumentation, and raises deeper questions still about
the nature, status and application of reasoned thinking.
Having provided this overview of the A-R-T course, there now
follows a more detailed description and discussion of how it attempts
to meet the demands as a critical thinking course for non-philosophers.
Making it accessible and engaging
In this section the use of examples (including the use of humour in
teaching argument forms and fallacies), and the link between fallacies
and psychology are discussed.
1.The use of examples
Even a hardened anti-critical thinker is likely to both enjoy Twelve
Angry Men and appreciate the relevance of argumentation to its plot. As
well as being a helpful resource in the ways described, the film helps
136
Stuart Hanscomb—Teaching Critical Thinking Beyond Philosophy
to make the course more interesting and relevant. It is one thing to
know that argumentation is vital to legal proceedings, another to see it
in action (albeit in fiction).9
The judicious use of examples is of course fundamental to good
teaching, but critical thinking is perhaps more reliant on them than
other subject areas. It both runs the risk of being dry (and thus losing
the audience’s attention), and of being off-puttingly formal and abstract
(and thus undermining the audience’s confidence). The concentrated
employment of examples is also necessary because critical thinking is
as much a skill as it is a body of explicit knowledge, and so students
need constant practice. A prime arena is the process of describing and
explaining the many arguments forms and fallacies. Examples
—perhaps a few for each of the (many) types—are of course necessary,
and a useful exercise is to hand students a list of fallacious arguments
prior to any other input, and to ask them to explain in everyday
language what is wrong with them.
Everyday exemplars are relatively easy to come by or to concoct
(although this is significantly time-consuming). The most effective are
those which, according to studies in rhetoric, the modern psychology of
persuasion, and common sense, the audience can best recognise and
relate to, and those that are most entertaining. A recent incident at the
World Cup finals, for example, provides an excellent case of a slippery-
slope fallacy. As a result of Frank Lampard’s overlooked goal against
the Germans, Fifa’s ruling against the use of goalline technology came
under scrutiny. Amongst the arguments that had contributed to their
decision was the following from Fifa general secretary Jérôme Valcke:
If we start with goalline technology, then any part of the game and
pitch will be a potential space where you could put in place tech-
nology to see if the ball was in or out, and then you end up with
video replays.The door is closed.10
This is somewhat tragic, but fortunately, from a teaching perspective,
argument forms and fallacies also lend themselves quite readily to
9 I have also used scenes from US TV drama Boston Legal, although more to
demonstrate rhetoric than argumentation.
10 http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/mar/06/fifa-rejects-goalline-
technology
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humour. It is not hard to see why since humour thrives on the recogniz-
able but not fully articulated errors and absurdities of everyday life.
Question-begging arguments are an excellent case in point, for
example:
God exists
How do you know?
The Bible says so
How do you know that what the Bible says is true?
Because the Bible is the word of God 
Or,
I have psychic powers
How do you know?
My psychic aunt told me, and only a psychic can know if you’re 
psychic.
How do you know she’s really psychic?
Well, because I’m psychic of course.
Generalizations are, in the words of Henry Rollins, ‘never right, always
fun’,11 and both Charlie Brooker and Mark Steel have an excellent
knack for exaggerated and absurdist analogies, such as:
the govt admits tax avoidance in 2006 was somewhere between
£97 billion and £150 billion, whereas benefit fraud amounted to less
than £1 billion. So their obsession with benefit fraud makes about
as much sense as if, after the Great Train Robbery, the police had
said, ‘We have excellent news.The robbers have got away and are a
vital part of the economy. But we DID catch three passengers who
didn’t have a valid ticket.12
2. Fallacies and psychology 
The majority of students might not have much immediate interest in
informal logic, but many do have an interest in psychology. Plenty of
11 Talk is Cheap Volume 3 (audio recording, 2004)
12 Steel, Mark, What’s Going On (London: Simon & Schuster, 2008) pp. 197-8
138
Stuart Hanscomb—Teaching Critical Thinking Beyond Philosophy
work has been carried out by cognitive psychologists on reasoning
(such as the Wason selection task,13 and the ‘Linda problem’14), but
surprisingly few critical thinking textbooks refer to such research. If we
then take notice of the relationship between fallacies and emotion, and
fallacies and social psychology, it is perhaps even more surprising that
authors like Douglas Walton and Christopher Tindale are content to
restrict references to psychology to the casual armchair variety.15
There seems to be three discernable ways in which the critical
thinking-psychology link can be and, to varying degrees, is handled by
texts that are student-friendly. The first is the highly informal
(‘armchair’) approach just mentioned. The second is books and articles
which address reasoning and, in particular, reasoning errors from a psy-
chological perspective. The particular kind of approach I have in mind
here is one which is applied, and potentially interdisciplinary. The
advantage of these texts is that they do not assume any prior learning
in cognitive and social psychology, and are therefore accessible to
students from all sorts of backgrounds. The art, then, is to produce
something which avoids superficiality and popularism; which con-
tributes meaningfully to the student’s contextualised knowledge of the
significance of reasoned thinking and constructive communication, but
which does not require specialist prerequisites. Two books which seem
to fit this bill very well are Stuart Sutherland’s Irrationality (1992), and
Scott Plous’ The Psychology of Judgement and Decision Making
(1993). The former includes chapters on, among other things, causal
mistakes, overconfidence, ignoring and distorting evidence, obedience
and conformity; the latter on many of these, as well as, among others,
attribution theory, availability and representativeness heuristics, cogni-
tive dissonance, framing and anchoring.
The third species of text is one where the primary orientation is
towards critical thinking in the way that is familiar to philosophers, but
which incorporates robust psychological theory and evidence as well.
13 Wason, P. ‘Reasoning’, in Foss, B. M.,  (ed.) New Horizons in Psychology, I
(Harmondsworth: Pengion, 1966)
14 Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D., ‘Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: the
Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgement’, Psychology Review, 90.
15 For example, when discussing ad hominem arguments Tindale says that ‘they
build on our natural tendency to connect what is said with the person or people
saying it.’ (Fallacies and Argument Appraisal, p.86)
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16 For example, see Saunders, Clare and Over, David, ‘In Two Minds about Ratio-
nality?’ in Evans and Frankish (eds.) In Two Minds: Dual Processes and Beyond.
(Oxford: OUP 2009).
17 The God Delusion (London: Bantam Press, 2006)
18 See, e.g. Tooby and Cosmides’ Foreword In Baron-Cohen, S., Mindblindness: An
Essay on Autism and Theory of Mind (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press,
1995).
19 Caveman Logic (Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2009).
20 I say ‘could potentially be’, but I am conscious that this is research I am yet to
come across. I would be interested to hear of any leads readers might have.
A lot of interesting research has been carried out in this area in pursuit
of a naturalistic theory of rationality,16 but in terms of accessible texts
to supplement broad-based courses like the one being described, I
know of no such examples. What I have in mind is a work that places
psychological evidence alongside the argument forms and fallacies in a
way that serves to deepen understanding through the introduction of
wider contexts, and through a wider and more thoroughly researched
range of examples. It is, say, Walton, Sutherland and up-to-date
research into naturalistic approaches to rationality, spliced together.
To use Richard Dawkins’ terminology,17 psychological evidence
can provide ‘proximal’ explanations for the types of fallacies we are
prone to, but this still leaves us with the ‘but why are we this way
endowed?’ question; the need for ‘ultimate’ explanations. Evolutionary
psychology has attempted to provide answers.18 For instance, the fol-
lowing question could be posed: The fallacies typically discussed in
critical thinking books are common errors of reasoning. Some, though,
are more common than others; for example fallacious appeals to
authority and to popular opinion; ad hominem arguments; causal falla-
cies, and hasty generalizations. Since the kinds of errors found in rea-
soning are potentially limitless (as the ever increasing number of falla-
cies attests to), why do these stand out? One reason could be that they
are linked to hard-wired cognitive and emotional tendencies that serve
particular adaptive ends.
Hank Davies19 has written on the evolutionary origins of causal
fallacies, and several other common argument forms and errors could
potentially be linked with other principles of psychology.20 For
example, appeals to authority and to popular opinion correspond to
obedience to authority and to conformity, which are among the central
phenomena studied by social psychologists. Another example is the
‘halo effect’; our tendency to automatically extend known positives in
a person (e.g. that they are physically attractive) to a range of other,
unrelated, positives (e.g. that they are kind and intelligent). This could
also account for the frequency of fallacious appeals to authority (the
assumption that expertise in one area implies expertise in others), and
its opposite—the ‘horn effect’—is easily associated with the abusive
ad hominem arguments. 
The claim, then, is that certain argument forms and fallacies
feature heavily in critical thinking texts, not because of the arbitrary
preferences and traditions of philosophers, or even the localised ten-
dencies of a certain culture, but because they are symptomatic of wider
bio-psycho-social forces. If this holds any water then it is hopefully
both interesting and illuminating, and serves to provide a foundation
(and motivation) for the study of thinking and logical errors that is
more extensive than what is otherwise on offer. Moreover, such work
is clearly interdisciplinary, and thus can be especially enriching of a
curriculum, and aligns itself with aspects of current educational
policy.21
The connection between fallacies and emotions is another area of
critical thinking where these kinds of explanations can be illuminating,
but where explicit links are thin on the ground in critical thinking text-
books. Many of these include categories of ‘emotional appeals’22—to
fear, guilt, pity, indignation etc.—and broadly speaking we are prone to
commit more fallacies when in an emotional state. Some errors,
however, seem more typically to result from strong emotions than
others—notably false dichotomies, slippery slopes, hasty generaliza-
tions, and the perfectionist fallacy23—all of them might be called ‘fal-
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21 Scotland 3-18 years Curriculum for Excellence places a great deal of emphasis
on interdisciplinarity.
22 For instance Bowell and Kemp (op cit), Walton, Informal Logic (Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1989), Pirie, How to Win Every Argument (London: Continuum,
2006).
23 Many of these map onto Aaron Beck’s illogical thought patterns (see, e.g., Cog-
nitive Therapy and the Emotional Disorders (New York: International University
Press, 1976), and ‘a belief in our profound inadequacy unless we are perfect in
everything we do’ is one of Albert Ellis’ central ‘irrational beliefs’ (see Reason and
Emotion in Psychotherapy (New York: Lyle Stuart, 1970).
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lacies of exaggeration’.
The cognitive changes that emotional states engender are well
recognised in psychology.24 Like part of Milgram’s explanation of our
perverse sensitivity to authority figures, the problematic impact
emotions have on clear thinking can also be explained by evolutionary
pressures. When in states of fear and anxiety, for example, attention
and recall become more narrow-beamed and selective as our adaptive
psychology focuses us on immediate threats. With judgements and
decision making, emotions can quicken the process. Perceptions and
interpretations become more black and white, and short cuts are taken.
Emotions, in effect, function as heuristic devices. Keith Oatley and
Jennifer Jenkins concisely summarize the situation, understanding
emotions as:
structuring the cognitive system into distinct modes of organiza-
tion. The effects of this structuring are to modify perception, to
direct attention, to give preferential access to certain memories,
and to bias thinking. … Emotions function to manage our multiple
motives, switching attention from one concern to another when
unforeseen events affecting these concerns occur. 25
At this point it is worth returning a final time to Twelve Angry Men
again so as to acknowledge how well the play illustrates the insepara-
bility of argument and emotion. Up to a point at least, the title is the
give-away. Most of the jurors are angry at one time or another, some
are angry all the time (even if it’s displaced), and there is a clear corre-
lation between heightened emotion and poor argumentation (including,
in this setting, frequent use of ad baculums). Moreover, it provides
plenty of examples of cognitive dissonance and the ‘magical thinking’
process that Sartre discusses; of how, in bad faith, we subintentionally
employ emotion to transform situations which we don’t like and which
are beyond our control. His discussion of the ‘motionlessness’ and
preference for solitude associated with sadness provides a good
example. In ‘sorrow’ he says:
141
24 See, for example, Oatley and Jenkins, Understanding Emotions (Oxford: Black-
well, 1996) pp. 263-77.
25 Op cit, p. 252.
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one of the accustomed conditions of our activity has vanished, yet
we are still required to act in and upon the world without it. Most
of the potentialities of our world (work to be done, people to see,
duties of the daily round to be accomplished) remain the same.
Only the means of realizing them … have changed. If, for example,
I have just learned that I am [financially] ruined, I no longer dispose
of the same means (a private car, etc.) to accomplish them. I shall
have to substitute means new to me (talking the bus, etc.), which is
precisely what I do not want to do. My melancholy is a method of
suppressing the obligation to look for these new ways … I make
the world into an affectively neutral reality … In other words,
lacking both the ability and the will to carry out the projects I
formally entertained, I behave in such a manner that the universe
requires nothing more from me.26
Refracted through the emotion, the meaning and value of the world
changes, providing some (temporary) comfort.
Also of interest in this regard is Aristotle’s recognition of the
power of emotions to distort our judgements. He says, for example, that
‘things don’t seem the same for those who love and those who hate
[etc.] … but either altogether different or different in magnitude’;27 that
‘we do not give judgement in the same way when aggrieved and when
pleased, in sympathy and in revulsion …’,28 and, ‘to the man who is
enthusiastic and optimistic, if what is to come should be pleasant, it
seems to be both likely to come about and likely to be good, while to
the indifferent or depressed man it seems the opposite.’29 This under-
lines the relative timelessness of some aspects of the psychology of
argument and persuasion, and opens the door to a consideration of
other enduring tendencies and principles found in Aristotle (and other
ancients), and as explored by modern psychologists like Robert
Cialdini and Howard Gardiner.30 What use that can be made of these
connections in the teaching of critical thinking? With the exception of
the effects of emotion on cognition, in A-R-T there is currently no
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27 Art of Rhetoric, p. 141.
28 Op cit, p.75.
29 Op cit, p. 141.
30 Cialdini, R., Influence (New York: Collins, 2007); Gardiner, H., Changing Minds
(Harvard Business School Press, 2006).
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robust theoretical exploration of the psychology of reasoning errors.
This is the result of the limitations of the staff’s knowledge, as well as
(and related to) the (apparent) absence of much relevant interdiscipli-
nary research in this area. As should be apparent from the preceding
discussion, many of the associations are, to us, only tentative.
However, mention in passing is made of the kinds of things discussed
here, and such speculation can serve as an interesting aside, and as a
catalyst for the interesting (but inevitably speculative) question ‘Why
these fallacies?’
At the very least, reference to psychology gestures to the interdis-
ciplinary significance of critical thinking (see further comments below
under ‘Recognizing its value in other disciplines’). It points also to the
importance of studying argumentation in so far as it reveals potentially
deep and wide-ranging things about human thought and behaviour. In
many ways it serves as a convenient viewing point for surveying
various academic terrains; as well as casting light on the psychology of
reasoning (and vice versa), the study of argumentation can help to con-
struct taxonomies of epistemology (authority, analogy, consequences,
causes etc.), and it can help explain vital mechanisms of politics and
ethics (for example the importance of reason, clarity, and rules of
dialogue to a healthy democracy).
Communicating the broad relevance of critical
thinking
The communication of the general relevance of critical thinking has
clear ties to the business of making it accessible and engaging. If
teaching this subject in a non-alienating way requires a strong emphasis
on context and examples, then everyday and professional relevance
will follow suit. Examples, as we have seen, are drawn from current
affairs, politics, law and so on, and similarly case studies (such as
Twelve Angry Men, but also the use of political speeches and wider per-
suasive practices (in politics and marketing) in the ‘Rhetoric’ section,
and political negotiations and debates in the ‘Theory’ section (e.g.
Michael Freeden on political conflict,31 and Christopher Tindale on
143
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Shell’s defence of its actions after the death of Ken Saro-Wiwa in
Nigeria)).32 In sum, students should be left with little doubt about the
role of argumentation and rhetoric in the majority of communicative
acts.
In terms of students’ personal sense of the significance of these
practices—a direct appreciation of how they do and can impact on their
interactions with other people in all kinds of situations—a few things
are important to mention. Firstly, previous research at the campus
presents clear evidence that A-R-T has influenced students’ argumenta-
tion and negotiation behaviours beyond the classroom.33 Secondly, the
extent and depth of this impact—which has the potential to affect a
wide range of psychological, social and practical domains—must be
partly up to the student. The detailed characterisations and dialogues of
Twelve Angry Men ought to encourage reflection on how we tend to
behave in various argumentation forums, especially when we are emo-
tional, but aside from the occasional generalised comment in this direc-
tion, there are limits on how far can and should go in this respect.
Nevertheless, opportunities for personal development are certain-
ly latent in critical thinking courses, and this does not have to be with
regard to especially deep characteristics and tendencies. A straightfor-
ward example might be pointing out to a student that they have used
(and perhaps often do use) a form of fallacious reasoning in a seminar
discussion (perhaps one about fallacies (oh the irony)). Again, it would
be inappropriate to force it, but perhaps the majority would be more
ready to reflect on their argumentation styles when the forum in which
it is exposed is focused on precisely this topic.
A similar argument can be made about the potential for these
courses developing, and encouraging reflection upon, other graduate
144
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32 Acts of Arguing (SUNY, 1999).
33 See Hanscomb, S., ‘The Critical Being of the Liberal Arts Student’, especially
pp. 106-7. Research has also indicated that in some cases students come to recog-
nise the benefits of the course in question (Argumentation-Rhetoric-Theory) only
after graduating (Harvey, Pattie and McFarlane-Dick, op cit.) This effect seems to
have something in common with what psychotherapist Irvin Yalom calls ‘time-
delayed interventions’; certain benefits of therapy only making themselves felt
months or years after the therapy took place. The Schopenhauer Cure (New York:
Harper Perennial, 2006), p.61.
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attributes such as open-mindedness, tolerance, humility, and healthy
scepticism. With respect to the latter, students have often commented
on how the study of both the fallacies, and the psychology of persua-
sion (especially the ‘contrast effect’), have an immediate impact on the
way they listen in everyday conversations, to political interviews and
radio phone-ins, and of course to advertising and sales people.
The third point regarding the personal impact of A-R-T on
students concerns the role of the formal debates, which comprise part
of the formative and summative assessment of the course. The debating
process is relatively familiar (although teams tend to contain at least
four people), topics chosen are pertinent to the course content (so that
they are congruent, and students are motivated to learn them deeply
and therefore debate better), and it is expected that students demon-
strate formal processes of argumentation and rhetoric. Among the chal-
lenges they face is the need to include several argument forms and/or
fallacies that are prescribed for them in advance. Marks are awarded
for clever usage of these devices in the context of the debate in
question.
As a form of assessment, debates have some obvious benefits:
they tick PDP/employability boxes regarding the development of pres-
entation skills and performing in front of an audience; they encourage
students to think on their feet, they encourage ownership of course
material, they involve teamwork, and they demand forms of civility
that can be hard won in tense, competitive and emotional environ-
ments. If resources like Twelve Angry Men should serve to encourage
students to reflect on their own ‘real world’ behaviours, then the doing
of it themselves should magnify this effect. The emotions generated by
attempting to function in teams, deliver convincing arguments in front
of audiences, respond to the unexpected arguments and stylistic
devices of the opposition etc. are now more than product of thought
and imagination.
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Recognizing its value in other disciplines 
1. Learning to learn
a) The broad benefits of critical thinking in terms of becoming a
better learner shouldn’t need spelling out in too much detail. In one
sense a course like A-R-T ought to hone a student’s critical abilities in
a way that will have a generalised, holistic, effect on their engagement
with most academic texts and tasks. They might realise this by them-
selves, but there is presumably no harm in letting them know it explic-
itly when explaining the ILOs, and then once or twice afterwards. 
b) The analytical tools students learn on courses like this are
clearly defined: identifying, categorizing, and evaluating arguments;
sensitivity to the blurry boundaries between rhetoric and argumenta-
tion; sensitivity to contexts and audiences, and so on. Some disciplines
will employ some of these more than others, but not many will make
their use of these tools and perspectives as explicit as they must neces-
sarily be on critical thinking courses. The result is insights that pene-
trate the ‘everydayness’ of academic writings; that X-ray otherwise
opaque methodologies, and critical styles that are often taken for
granted (or at least not fully explained) by the practitioners themselves.
c) Experience and evidence indicate that students are poorer than
we might imagine at close reading and summarizing. In higher educa-
tion in the UK the emphasis on critical assessment can marginalize
skills in communicating accurately and succinctly the content of a text,
but critical thinking courses need not exclude this skill. In A-R-T (and
other core courses) students are made well aware that argument recon-
struction is a form of summarizing, and is thus plainly transferable to
other subjects and courses. Regardless of the result being formalized in
terms of premises and conclusions, to do it well requires a close
reading and careful unpacking of what is presented.
d) A technique that has been used in A-R-T tutorials requires
students to reconstruct and evaluate arguments found in their own
essays (usually from other courses). This helps instil the idea that
essays are arguments (or series of arguments), encourages reflection
and more careful scrutiny of their work, and underlines the value of this
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method as a learning to learn tool.
A similar kind of angle is taken by the convenor of the introduc-
tory philosophy course at Glasgow University’s main campus. Whilst
spending some time offering essay advice in a lecture, he associates
typical errors with fallacies recently taught in the critical thinking part
of the course. For instance, avoid misrepresenting those you are writing
about (straw man fallacy); avoid expressions like ‘everyone knows that
...’ (vagueness and ad populum), or ‘it’s always the case that …’ (hasty
generalization), and make sure that the reasons and sub-arguments
included are all relevant to the overall conclusion.34
2. Substantive content
It is clear from much of what has been discussed that some of the
elements of critical thinking commonly found in textbooks are varia-
tions on phenomena that are the subject matter of other disciplines, par-
ticularly psychology, media and communication. In this way, not only
is critical thinking enriched by these disciplines in this substantial
manner (as discussed), but these disciplines are enriched by critical
thinking.
At a more formal level, learning in critical thinking can transfer
to other disciplines in terms of the kinds of arguments and epistemolo-
gies they utilize. For instance, appeals to authority are always relevant
(especially so in subjects like history and theology), and causal falla-
cies are particularly pertinent to social science. The use of academic
examples from a range of disciplines is a fairly straightforward way of
reinforcing this type of connection.
It should also be mentioned that critical thinking, as elucidated
here, is a properly interdisciplinary subject. Argumentation and rhetoric
are phenomena that can, with relative ease and significant benefit,
themselves be illuminated via a number of disciplines. Interdisciplinar-
ity, for good or bad, is currently receiving a lot of attention in UK
higher education, and courses like this, as well as serving as exemplars
of its virtues, can also be politically expedient. For example, there is no
reason why contributions in terms of ideas, resources and teaching
expertise can’t be corralled from a number of departments (or schools)
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and faculties (or colleges).
Further comments
1. A critical point to emerge from this is the importance of
knowing your audience. Since multiple examples are required to teach
critical thinking, then the more that these resonate with students’ inter-
ests and world views, the more effective they are likely to be. With phi-
losophy students examples from philosophy itself (like the Cartesian
Circle, or slippery slope arguments in the euthanasia debate) ought to
regenerate recognition and enthusiasm, but when teaching critical
thinking beyond philosophy, too much of this will be alienating. 
Aside from the Twelve Angry Men type case, the obvious fall-
back is the news stories etc. that have been discussed previously. What
this ideally requires, however, is not just keeping up to date with
current affairs, but with the stories and cultural phenomena that are
holding the interest of young adults (assuming that’s the majority of our
audience).35 It’s not being suggested that all our examples come from
trendy blogs and Big Brother, but more that references restricted to
things middle aged academics know and like could fail to stimulate.
2. A related issue concerns situations where certain students
(especially older ones) are more familiar with the subject matter being
addressed in the passage to be reconstructed and evaluated. Do they
have an advantage? In one sense yes, since they can thus be more alive
to the types of reasoning errors that can occur in particular topics and
forums (climate change, democratic processes, health issues etc.).
However, this sort of thing is a problem for the teaching of quite a few
arts and social science disciplines, and shouldn’t necessarily be a
source of particular angst for critical thinking. Also, there is a sense in
which this background knowledge (and views/opinions) can bias
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mature students’ reading of the arguments put forward, and/or distract
them from analysing what is actually in front of them.
3. There are some issues to do with the use of debates worthy of
further discussion. For a critical thinking course an additional benefit
of debates is that they provide a live forum for engaging in argumenta-
tion; in other words they progress, in certain respects, from the static
discipline of argument reconstruction and evaluation. There are,
however, some potential weaknesses as well:
a) One is their artificial and formal nature (including the role of
the chair, and time limitations of the delivery of arguments). As such
they are perhaps not the best method for exploring and practicing many
of the intricacies of argumentation. On the other hand they are far more
practical to manage and assess than, say, a scenario in which we
observe pairs of students generating persuasion dialogues. Also, it can
be said that their weaknesses are also their strengths: formality, the
presence of an audience, the time restrictions etc. all have valuable
extraneous benefits in terms of generic skills and personal develop-
ment.
b) A number of participants over the years have commented on
not just the artificiality of debates, but their combative and ‘masculine’
nature. One benefit of this is that when we reach the feminist/coales-
cent argumentation section of the course they are all the more ready for,
and welcoming of it. The contrast is all the more vivid because they
have had to do it, not just read about it. In debates, coalescence is not
the name of the game (and nor can it be since although debates are a
kind of game, coalescent argumentation is very much not), and there’s
a strong case for saying that that’s just okay. Argumentation is usually
competitive, so it’s a taste of an important feature of everyday civilian
and professional communication. Also, as indicated, the formal
demands of the debating process—even if always somewhat repellent
and alien for some students—foster a number of useful skills. 
c) For debates to be a fair and thorough form of assessment,
students need practice. Formative as well as summative debates will be
necessary, and this is a time-consuming process. Rarely will it be prac-
tical to use whole-class time, so the appropriate forum is tutorials or
seminars. If, say, a group of twelve is divided into teams of three, and
each team needs to take part in two debates (a formative and a summa-
tive), that’s four class hours devoted to debates. All the time they are
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debating topics pertinent to the course this time is all the more justified.
However, with assessment there is a potential staff-time issue if it is felt
that the summative debates should be marked by two tutors. (Aside
from the moderation/second marking factor, the reason is that it is very
hard to catch everything that goes on in complex oral presentations
(and indeed marking them effectively requires a lot of practice). Two
sets of ears and eyes are considerably more reliable than one.) If this
causes budget and other logistical problems, then, if debates are felt to
be important enough, mitigation measures might include dropping, or
shortening, one of the other assessments.
4. The final point to raise concerns the way and extent to which
critical thinking is generic across academic disciplines, and the associ-
ated question of whether, even if this is significantly the case, it is best
taught in this top-down manner rather than within the context of indi-
vidual subjects. There is not the space here to do justice to these
complex issues, but what can be said is that it is congruent with, and
well within the remit of a course like A-R-T to discuss this issue as
well. The ‘top-down’ question is, after all, addressed in part by the
ever-present question of context, and to raise this, and the matter of
broad applicability, is to extend the course’s interdisciplinary range to
include education as well.
To the extent that A-R-T is a success as a critical thinking course
that works beyond the boundaries of philosophy, our belief is that this
is due to careful attention paid to the how its content is selected and
communicated, and how its ideas and techniques are contextualised in
terms of their relevance beyond disciplinary boundaries and beyond
educational settings. There are no doubt courses out there similar to,
and better than this one, but it is hoped that some of the theory,
resources and techniques that have been described and assessed here
will be relatively distinctive and appealing, and be of practical use to
others. As you would expect, the course continues to develop, and as
part of this process the author is welcoming of suggestions and
comments from other practitioners. 
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